S. HRG. 98-8

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY AUTHORIZATIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

S. 608

A BILL TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT, AS AMENDED, IN ORDER TO EXTEND AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS

MARCH 9, 1983

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ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY AUTHORIZATIONS

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 9, 1983

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SD–419, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Pell, and Biden.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will now call the panel on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr. James L. George, Acting Director, Thomas Graham, Jr., and Mr. William J. Montgomery.

Could we have our witnesses come forward, please?

Today we will hear testimony on the authorization request of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for fiscal years 1984 and 1985. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is one of the smallest agencies in the U.S. Government, but its mandate covers the single most important policy of this administration and, indeed, any government today, the prevention of nuclear war through arms control, particularly through significant verifiable arms reductions.

I am a strong supporter of a strong arms control agency. Only through its efforts can we hope to rid mankind of the risks and costs of the arms race. I think we are all aware of the risks inherent in nuclear weapons. A single, 1-megaton bomb, exploding over the Capitol or over the city of Chicago, would kill almost everyone and level most structures for miles around. The surviving burn victims in each city would exceed the capacity of burn-treatment facilities throughout the United States. Life as we know it would cease to exist, and survivors would envy the dead.

In preparation for this, we are spending a quarter of a trillion dollars each and every year. That sum shows no sign of decreasing unless we have arms reduction.

A nuclear war is more likely to occur through either accident or miscalculation than through a deliberate decision. This is because neither man nor his machines are perfect, and the longer it takes to rid ourselves of nuclear weapons, the more likely it is that an unintended war would start.

ACDA, therefore, has the most important responsibility of this Government. Its assets in meeting this task are limited. The ACDA budget request calls for approximately $21 million in each fiscal year, 1984 and 1985. This compares with a quarter of a trillion dollars a year for defense. In comparison with that budget, it costs the taxpayers one ten-thousandths as much, or about as much as a single medium-priced fighter aircraft, to fund ACDA.

The total number of ACDA employees stands today at 154, down from 184 in fiscal year 1981. As one of my colleagues, Senator Pell, has noted, there are 38 military bandsmen for each arms control specialist in the U.S. Government. Still, in my view, making ACDA an

effective force in national security policy is not an issue of quantity but quality.

We are here today to assess the direction being adopted by the Agency to be sure it runs in parallel with the intent of the ACDA statute and to judge whether or not there are sufficient human and financial resources to do the job. I can assure you, gentlemen, that this committee and I are committed to enhancing both the role and capacity of this Agency in moving toward significant, verifiable arms control agreements.

[Text of S. 608 follows:]

98TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 608

To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to extend the authorization for appropriations.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 28 (legislative day, FEBRUARY 23), 1983

Mr. PERCY (by request) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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A BILL

To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to extend the authorization for appropriations.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Section 49(a) (22 U.S.C. 2589(a)) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, is further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 49. (a) To carry out the purposes of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated—

(1) for the fiscal year 1984, $21,385,000 and for the fiscal year 1985, $21,675,000 (and such additional amounts as may be necessary for increases in salary,

pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, and other nondiscretionary costs, and to offset adverse fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates). Amounts appropriated under this subsection are authorized to remain available until expended.".

The CHAIRMAN. Today we will receive testimony from James L. George, Acting Director of ACDA. Mr. George is accompanied by Thomas Graham, Jr., Director of the Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs, and William J. Montgomery, the Administrative Director.

Dr. George, we are pleased to have you with us.

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES L. GEORGE, ACTING DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY THOMAS GRAHAM, JR., DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WILLIAM J. MONTGOMERY, ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, AND ARCH TURRENTINE, ACTING ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF NUCLEAR AND WEAPONS CONTROL, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Dr. GEORGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With your permission, I will submit my full statement for the record and summarize it briefly.

The CHAIRMAN. Your full statement will be incorporated into the record and you may summarize as you see fit.

Dr. GEORGE. Fine.

Also accompanying me, Mr. Chairman, is Mr. Arch Turrentine, the Acting Assistant Director of our Bureau of Nuclear and Weapons Control.

Our request for the fiscal year ending 1984 is $21,385,000. It is explained more fully in the package presented to the committee. Suffice it to say that while our request is adequate for requirements as we now know them, it does represent a very lean budget without any padding.

With respect to our organization, the Agency includes four principal bureaus. These are the Bureau of Multilateral Affairs, the Bureau of Nuclear and Weapons Control, the Bureau of Strategic Programs, and the Bureau of Verification and Intelligence. These groups are supported by the Offices of Administration, General Counsel and Congressional Relations.

All of these offices support line bureaus and ACDA's various negotiating delegations. These delegations are the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks [START], the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear

Forces] Delegation, and the SCC [Standing Consultative Commission] delegation.

As you know, the START talks began on June 29, 1982. There have already been two rounds of talks. A third round will begin in February 1983. The INF talks began November 30, 1981. We held three rounds in 1982 and started a fourth round in late January 1983.

ACDA also has primary responsibility for supporting the permanent U.S.-U.S.S.R. Standing Consultative Commission, which meets at least twice a year. During the fall of 1982, we reviewed the ABM Treaty and we will be going back to Geneva soon.

ACDA also has responsibilities for the U.S. participation in a variety of multilateral disarmament bodies. These include the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament [CD] in Geneva, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna.

We are also concerned with nuclear nonproliferation policy. This is one of our top priorities, and ACDA will be the lead agency for the 1985 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

As required by law, ACDA prepares an annual report to Congress. On January 31, 1983, the eighth such report was submitted to Congress. ACDA also prepares a yearly review of World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, which is found very useful by scholars and the press.

Other useful publications, such as a treaty book and documents on disarmament are prepared as well.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my brief statement. Our present thinking on general allocations of authorized funds for the 2 years is reflected on pages 2, 3, 12, and 13 of the legislative program which is appended to my statement.

I would like to repeat that we feel that this authorization request is well-conceived, adequate and lean. With this amount of financial support, we can accomplish our mission.

I would now be happy to answer any questions you might have.

[Dr. George's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES L. GEORGE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before this Committee to seek your support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's 2-year authorization request of $21,385,000 for fiscal year 1984 and $21,675,000 for fiscal year 1985. In support of this, I will review some of the Agency's recent activities and anticipated future initiatives. Mr. William J. Montgomery, ACDA's Director of Administration, and Mr. Thomas Graham, Jr., ACDA's Director of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs, are with me today and they will join me in responding to questions you may wish to raise.

As you know, I have been serving since January 14, 1983 as the Acting Director of ACDA, pending the confirmation of a new Director. As the Acting Director, I have reviewed the Agency's request to ensure that there will be sufficient resources available to permit ACDA to carry out its responsibilities.

I believe that the authorization request for ACDA, which includes the funding for the Reduced Enrichment in Research and Test Reactors Program, is adequate for the Agency to carry out its mission and to conduct the various arms control negotiations which are in progress on the schedules as we now know them. The authorization for the 2 years represents lean budgets without padding which should not be reduced below requested level. I will discuss this in more detail

later in my testimony and in our responses to questions the Committee may wish to pose.

Let me now highlight some of ACDA's programs and activities.

SUMMARY OF RECENT ACTIVITIES

Organization

ACDA's primary responsibilities continue to be centered on advising and assisting the President, the Secretary of State, the National Security Council, the Congress, and other appropriate Government officials on arms control issues. During the past year the Agency has been reorganized and now includes four principal Bureaus which carry out the mission and line activities of the Agency. These include the Bureaus of Multilateral Affairs, Nuclear and Weapons Control, Strategic Programs, and Verification and Intelligence. These groups are supported by the Offices of Administration, General Counsel and Congressional Relations and Public Affairs which function as service units to provide support to the line Bureaus and ACDA's various negotiating delegations. These delegations presently include the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks (INF), and the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). ACDA has primary responsibility for providing financial, personnel and administrative resources for all these negotiations. The Agency has a secondary responsibility for administrative support for the United States delegation to the Committee on Disarmament (CD) and the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations. These delegations receive the bulk of their resources from the Department of State.

Arms control negotiations

Following the Administration's thorough review of U.S. defense and arms control policies, we now have a very full agenda for arms control. I will now review the involvement of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in this broad spectrum of arms control activities, initiatives and negotiations.

During the last year, ACDA has participated extensively in the final phase of the Administration's review of strategic arms control policy in preparation for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). In support of these negotiations ACDA has had responsibility, with other interested agencies, for generating and analyzing specific proposals, and for evaluating the verifiability of such proposals and their implications for U.S. national security.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks began in Geneva, Switzerland, on June 29, 1982, and two rounds of talks have been completed; the third round began in February 1983. The U.S. START delegation is under the direction of Ambassador Edward L. Rowny. Negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), which began in Geneva on November 30, 1981, held three rounds in 1982. The fourth round began in late January 1983. The U.S. INF delegation is under the direction of Ambassador Paul H. Nitze. During negotiations, the Agency has a primary role in coordinating interagency efforts in support of both INF and START. ACDA has also had a leading role in the development of the President's proposals for Confidence-Building Measures and their incorporation into START and INF negotiations.

For the remainder of fiscal year 1983, ACDA expects to continue to work with other agencies to prepare for and support START and INF negotiations, and is engaged on a continuing basis in coordinating with other agencies the preparation and analysis of U.S. positions on these matters.

ACDA has primary responsibility for supporting the permanent U.S.-U.S.S.R. Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) which meets at least twice a year to deal with implementation of, and compliance with, existing strategic arms agreements and the Accidents Measures Agreement of 1971. During the fall of 1982, a review of the ABM Treaty as required by Article XIV of that treaty was conducted in a third 1982 session of the SCC. The Agency expects that there will be at least two sessions of the SCC in fiscal years 1984 and 1985.

ACDA is also responsible for the United States participation in a variety of multilateral disarmament bodies. These include the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva; the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, which deals exclusively with disarmament and related issues; the United Nations Disarmament Commission; and the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna, between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. In addition to providing much of the staffing for our delegations to these bodies, ACDA prepares guidance and supports their efforts from the Washington end.

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The Committee on Disarmament meets each year for a total of approximately 6 months, with sessions from February through April and again in the summer from June through August. The U.N. General Assembly's First Committee meets each fall for approximately 2 months, usually mid-October to mid-December. As for the U.N. Disarmament Commission, it normally meets once each year for 3 weeks, usually in May or June. All of these are, of course, standing bodies, in which United States participation will continue for the foreseeable future.

Our participation in these bodies requires the development of policy on a variety of arms control issues. ACDA plays a leading role in this interagency process. In the Committee on Disarmament, for example, among the issues under consideration or negotiation are such things as a nuclear test ban, a convention to ban chemical weapons, a convention to ban radiological weapons, and possible further arms control measures affecting outer space. The United Nations General Assembly each fall addresses a wide range of disarmament issues, on which ACDA takes the lead in developing United States positions for use in the Assembly's debate and in negotiations on the development of Assembly resolutions. Last fall the First Committee passed almost 60 resolutions, dealing with such matters as nuclear freezes, nuclear weapons free zones, the no-first-use or non-use of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive nuclear test ban, chemical weapons use, the reporting of and limitations on military spending, outer space arms control, and a host of other matters.

ACDA also continues to play an important part in the development of policy for the control of nuclear testing. The President has decided to seek Soviet agreement to strengthen verification procedures on the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties. The Administration's long-term goal is to conclude a comprehensive test ban within the context of broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions.

The MBFR negotiations seem likely to continue throughout fiscal year 1984. Last summer a new draft treaty providing for NATO and Warsaw Pact force reductions was tabled by the Western side. This draft was developed primarily by ACDA. In addition, the Soviet Union has just recently unveiled a new proposal of its own regarding force reductions, so it seems likely that these negotiations will have much material to address in the months ahead.

Finally, I should note ACDA's involvement in the Madrid Review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). As you know, agreement has not yet been reached on a concluding document for that meeting, which is continuing at this time. If agreement is reached at Madrid, one of the principal results of this meeting could be the convening of a Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. It is possible that a preparatory meeting and initial sessions of such a conference could be held this year, and continue into fiscal year 1984. ACDA will play an important role in the United States participation in such a conference.

Non-proliferation

Nuclear non-proliferation policy remains one of ACDA's focal points for fiscal years 1984 and 1985. Preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons is vital not only to our national security interests, but to the goals of global peace and security. The challenges of preventing further proliferation will continue to grow in the coming year, and the demands on ACDA's role as both a lead agency and a key coordinating agency in this field will also increase. ACDA will continue to play an important role in the development and analysis of regional approaches to non-proliferation, in the enhancement of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, in devising strategies to enhance bilateral security measures to decrease motivations for proliferation, and in initiating new strategies for consultations with other supplier states.

Cooperation between nuclear supplier and recipient states will be of increasing importance. As the lead agency for the 1985 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, ACDA will be intensifying efforts to consult and reach agreement with other nations about international safeguards, physical security and security measures, and long-term issues such as fuel storage and waste management. The NPT Review Conference will be a major challenge in international diplomacy and its outcome will have major repercussions on the goals and objectives of non-proliferation. Extensive consultations with other states and major preparation for at least one FY Preparatory Committee meeting is central to our non-proliferation efforts at this point.

In addition, ACDA will continue to have a major responsibility in the nuclear export field, including not only evaluation of our national policies, but also multinational consultations. Cooperation among current and emergency supplier states will also be a focus of ACDA's activities in the non-proliferation field.

It is also clear that ACDA will play an important role in efforts to increase the effectiveness of the international safeguards regime.

ACDA will continue to devote significant efforts to the areas already mentioned and, in addition, to the more technical areas of non-proliferation policy such as safeguards and physical security for plutonium in all stages of the fuel cycle, and to safeguard other advanced technologies. We will continue to promote full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America and to encourage universal adherence to the NPT and will devote a great deal of time and energy to exploring ways to bring about full adherence to these important treaties.

We expect that the need to control the spread of nuclear weapons will continue in the coming years, and we are committed to ACDA's full and active participation in the full range of activities which surround this critical issue.

Arms and technology transfer

ACDA is involved on a day-to-day basis with the Departments of State and Defense and other concerned agencies to ensure that the arms control implications of proposed exports of conventional weapons and militarily-useful technology are given full consideration.

Pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, we advise the Secretary of State and, as appropriate, the President on the extent to which proposed transfers of conventional arms will contribute to an arms race, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements. When so requested, ACDA, in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense, prepares for the Congress evaluations of the arms control implications of particular proposed sales. We also prepare statements of arms control considerations involved in each country program for inclusion in the annual Executive Branch request to the Congress for U.S. security assistance.

ACDA also participates with other agencies in controlling exports of technology with both military and commercial applications ("dual-use" technology). We give particular attention to those cases involving the possible transfer of strategic technology to the Soviet Union and its allies, and those with a potentially adverse effect on arms control verification. In our review of "North-South" technology transfer cases, we are particularly concerned with minimizing the risk of adverse effects on regional stability of unauthorized third-country transfers.

As a result of greatly intensified Soviet efforts to acquire Western technology and the rapid advances in militarily-useful technology, we will be required to consider increasingly complex technology transfer policy issues in the future. We will be devoting more and more attention to the arms control issues raised by peaceful cooperation and trade in space technology, in order to limit the proliferation of strategic missile programs.

Defense programs and analysis

The Agency's Defense Program and Analysis Division is responsible for evaluating the national security implications of arms control proposals and for conducting analyses of defense policies, programs, and technologies as they relate to arms control. As required by law, the Division prepares the annual submission of arms control impact statements (ACIS) to the Congress. In addition, the Division prepared the *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* (WMEAT) publication and provides analytic support to other ACDA arms control activities. The Division also provides the Agency point of contact for operational activities related to Antarctica Inspections.

January 31, 1983 marked the eighth annual submission of ACIS by the Executive Branch to the Congress. In 1975 Congress enacted Section 36 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act which requires submission of arms control impact statements to Congress with requests for authorization or appropriation for certain defense, technology, and nuclear programs. Each impact statement analyzes the possible implications of these programs for arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations. Detailed information about the programs

under consideration, including an analysis of weapon capabilities, stated military requirements, and funding, are contained in each impact statement. However, the principal portion of each ACIS is devoted to a comprehensive arms control analysis. This year's submission (FY 1984) included 10 ACIS covering 85 Department of Defense and Department of Energy programs.

Allocations of authorized funds

Our present thinking on general allocations of authorized funds for the 2 years is reflected on pages 2, 3, 12 and 13 of the presentation booklet we have submitted to the Committee.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would like to repeat that we feel that this authorization request is well conceived and lean. We can, with this amount of financial support, accomplish our mission. However, I urge that the Committee support this request in its full amount. If the work of the Agency and its delegations overseas expand significantly beyond those which are presently planned, it will be necessary for us to seek supplemental funding. My colleagues and I will now be happy to answer any questions which you may have.

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

98th CONGRESS

1st Session

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM, 98TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION

MARCH 1983

This presentation supports the request of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for legislation amending the Arms Control and Disarmament Act to extend the authorization for appropriations for FY 1984 and FY 1985.

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Standing Consultative Commission
Committee on Disarmament
United Nations General Assembly
United Nations Disarmament Commission
NATO Disarmament Experts
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM FOR THE

FIRST SESSION OF THE 98th CONGRESS

A BILL

To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to extend the authorization for appropriations.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, Section 49 (a) (22 U.S.C. 2589 (a)) is further amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 49(a) To carry out the purposes of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated --

for the fiscal year 1984, $21,385,000 and

for the fiscal year 1985, $21,675,000

(and such additional amounts for each such fiscal year as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, and other nondiscretionary costs, and to offset adverse fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates). Amounts appropriated under this subsection are authorized to remain available until expended."

Explanation Of the Bill

The Agency's current two-year authorization expires on September 30, 1983. The proposed legislation would authorize appropriations of $21,385,000 for fiscal year 1984 and $21,675,000 for fiscal year 1985.

The funds authorized by this legislation will be devoted primarily to the conduct of, and support for, negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe (INF); at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START); at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks (MBFR); at the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament, where we are working to develop effective limitations on nuclear testing and chemical weapons; and at the United Nations in New York.

In addition, these funds will support implementation of our policy to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to other countries; to support our obligations under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons; and to enable us to fulfill other statutory arms control responsibilities.

Funds appropriated in fiscal year 1983 totaled $15,443,000: $14,291,000 for program operation and $1,152,000 for external research.

Total authorization requests for fiscal years 1984 and 1985 are $21,385,000 and $21,675,000 respectively.

Proposed funding for operating expenses is $15,305,000 in FY-84 and $15,643,000 in FY-85; an increase of $1,014,000 in FY-84 and $1,312,000 in FY-85 over FY-83 levels.

$6,080,000 and $6,032,000 are requested to be authorized for external research in FY-84 and FY-85. These requests include $4,980,000 in FY-84 and $4,932,000 in FY-85 to cover expenses related to the Reduced Enrichment in Research and Test Reactors program (RERTR) which OMB decided to transfer to ACDA from the Department of Energy. (See pages 12 and 13.)

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Fiscal Year 1984 and 1985

	Fiscal Year '84	Fiscal Year '85
	(Millions of Dollars)	
Authorizations	21.385	21.675
Program Operation	15.305	15.643
External Research*	6.080	6.032
Totals	21.385	21.675

*Includes $4,980,000 and $4,932,000 for the RERTR program in FY-84 and FY-85 respectively.

Comparative Fiscal Year 1983 Table
(Millions of Dollars)

Authorization	19.894
Appropriation	15.443
Program Operation	14.291
External Research	1.152
Total	15.443

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARAMENT AGENCY

SUMMARY OF ANTICIPATED REQUIREMENTS

I. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

START, INF, and SCC

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) between the US and the Soviet Union began in Geneva, Switzerland, on June 29, 1982. Two rounds of talks have been held; a third round began in February 1983. The US Delegation, with ACDA participation and support, has been presenting the President's START proposal. The US delegation is under the direction of Ambassador Edward L. Rowny of ACDA.

Negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), between the US and Soviet Union began in Geneva on November 30, 1981. Three rounds were held in 1982 and a fourth began in January 1983. A draft treaty developed and prepared with ACDA participation was presented in the first round implementing in detail the President's INF proposal The US INF delegation is under the direction of Ambassador Paul H. Nitze.

During negotiations, the Agency has a primary role in coordinating interagency efforts in support of both INF and START. It is engaged on a continuing basis in preparing and analyzing US positions on these talks. ACDA also has a representative on each delegation and provides and experts in support of the delegation.

ACDA also has primary responsibility for supporting the US component of the permanent US/USSR Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) which holds at least two sessions a year, normally in Geneva. In the SCC, the the US and USSR deal with matters related

to implementation of the ABM Treaty, SALT Interim Agreement of 1972 and the 1971 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of the Outbreak of Nuclear War. The SCC also considers compliance questions related to existing strategic arms agreements.

In addition to playing a major role in interagency efforts to prepare for SCC sessions, ACDA provides the US Commissioner as well as a major share of the staff and advisory personnel of the US Component for the bilateral sessions of the Commission.

Committee on Disarmament, the UN, and NATO

ACDA is responsible for guidance and staffing of US delegations to the Committee on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva; the UN General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee; the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC); the UN Group of Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons Experts, and the NATO Disarmament Experts.

The United States is actively working within the Committee on Disarmament for agreement on an international convention banning chemical weapons. This February it tabled with the Committee detailed proposals for the complete and verifiable elimination of chemical weapons. If successful, the convention would prohibit signatory nations from any activity that creates or maintains a chemical weapons capacity.

Other issues under consideration by the Committee are: a ban on nuclear testing, a convention banning radiological weapons, outer space arms control, assurances to non-nuclear weapon states that nuclear weapons will not be used against them, and the development of a comprehensive program of disarmament.

The principal task our delegation to the General Assembly's First Committee is to debate and negotiate the texts of disarmament resolutions passed by the Assembly. Among these are: a nuclear freeze, no-use and first-use of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons free zones, chemical weapons use and the Seabed Treaty.

MBFR

Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Vienna between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries are expected to continue. A new Western draft treaty proposal was developed in ACDA and presented in Vienna during the last half of 1982. The basic elements of these proposals will continue to be elaborated in the future as a constructive basis for progress in reducing conventional forces in Central Europe.

CSCE

The Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was unexpectedly extended and will continue throughout the first half of FY 1983. If agreement cannot be reached on a final concluding document by the mid-point of the fiscal year, the meeting could continue throughout FY 1983. If agreement is reached at Madrid, the preparatory meeting and the initial sessions of a Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe could be held during the latter part of FY 1983, and would likely continue throughout FY 1984.

Additional Responsibilities

ACDA continues to play a leading role in the interagency development of, as well as in the implementation and explanation of, U.S. policy on a variety of other arms control issues including: the Environmental Modification Treaty, which prohibits the use of military or other hostile environmental modification techniques, and the Biological Weapons Convention which prohibits the use of biological weapons. The UN decided last year that states parties to the Convention should convene a special meeting this year in order to strengthen compliance procedures for the Convention. The United States is a strong supporter of this proposal.

ACDA also continues to play an important part in the development of policy for the control of nuclear testing. The President has decided to seek Soviet agreement to strengthen verification procedures on the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties. The Administration's long-term goal is to conclude a comprehensive test ban within the context of broad, deep, and veriable arms reductions that justify confidence in Soviet compliance.

Support Functions

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has primary support responsibility for US delegations at START, INF, CD and SCC negotiations. ACDA has a secondary role in assisting the US delegation at the MBFR Talks, as well as at the CD. In order to permit our delegations in Geneva to function smoothly, the Agency leases office space there for use by START, INF, SCC and CD. ACDA maintains a small core administrative staff in Geneva year round to coordinate support activities. The present budget is based on the START and INF delegations being in Geneva about half of the year and the SCC somewhat less, about four to five months. Should circumstances warrant, the delegations may have to remain in Geneva for additional time and ACDA would then require supplemental funding.

II. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Nonproliferation challenges in the coming authorization period are expected to be at least as great as in previous years. In Southeast Asia, the Pakistan and Indian nuclear programs are likely to continue to pose major problems for US foreign policy and national security objectives. In the Middle East, the potential for proliferation could seriously disrupt further U.S. efforts to negotiate an overall peace settlement.

Proliferation trends toward the acquisition of nuclear technology and material in Latin America, Asia and Africa are likely to continue. New nuclear suppliers are likely to challenge existing export control measures and increase intelligence needs.

Reprocessed spent fuel in Japan and Euratom will result in a large amount of plutonium and will increase the demand for improved IAEA safeguards and physical security, as well as give more urgency to developing effective international efforts to manage plutonium. The basic tenets of IAEA safeguards relative to its objectives, goals and resource allocations are likely to undergo further challenges. The forthcoming NPT Review Conference in 1985 will draw attention to this cornerstone of nonproliferation and at least one NPT Preparatory Committee meeting will occur in FY 1984.

ACDA will be deeply involved in US nonproliferation efforts to meet the above and other nuclear proliferation challenges.

The Agency has lead responsibility in the Executive Branch for the crucial 1985 NPT Review Conference. Extensive preparations will be underway during FY 1984. Judging from the last two such conferences, the forthcoming conference will be even more complex and difficult.

Fiscal years 1984 and 1985 should also see a continuation of major diplomatic efforts to promote full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America. ACDA has always played a leading role within the Executive Branch in furthering the role of this Treaty in contributing to the security of Latin America.

ACDA also expects to respond to strong pressure to expand activities in improving safeguards and physical security for plutonium at all stages of the fuel cycle, in safeguarding advanced technologies such as gas centrifuge enrichment and other isotope separation techniques, in addressing nuclear technology transfers and safeguards problems in third countries, and in Congressional-public relations on the Administration's nuclear policies. These pressures will be directly related to the real or perceived increased proliferation risks in the Middle East, South Asia, Latin America and Southern Africa.

The complexity of nuclear nonproliferation and its crucial interaction with US foreign policy and national security involve a variety of measures in which ACDA is the lead US agency. These include: development of regional arrangements, enhanced bilateral national security measures to decrease national proliferation motivation, consultations with nuclear supplier states, strengthened international safeguards regime, and long-term spent fuel storage/ management arrangement.

Cooperation among nuclear supplier countries will continue to play an important role in nonproliferation. Keeping abreast of the problem becomes more demanding as more sophisticated purchasing techniques are devised. Another complicating factor is the emergence of new supplier states which have not yet accepted the international norms in this area, and may indeed seek to operate outside the reach of existing international guidelines. These problems relating to supplier activities are likely to grow worse in in FY 1984 and beyond.

The IAEA and the international safeguards systems will require particular attention during FY 1984 to minimize the introduction of extraneous political issues, to strengthen the technical capability and international credibility of

safeguards, and at the same time to address the adjustments in the basic safeguards tenets sought by several industrialized states.

The United States played a major role in the establishment of the IAEA in 1957 and since then has provided strong support to promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and ensuring the effectiveness of safeguards. In September 1982, however, the US was forced on political grounds to withdraw from the meeting of the IAEA General Conference, and to reassess its support for and participation in IAEA.

The US has now resumed participation, and plans to revitalize both its support efforts and direct interaction in the safeguards and nuclear technology areas.

III. ARMS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

ACDA, in coordination with the Departments of State and Defense, is involved on a daily basis in the implementation of the President's conventional arms transfer policy, as promulgated July 8, 1981. Within the US Government a broad range of factors, including arms control, are given important consideration in the arms transfer decision-making process. Requests for arms are evaluated on a case-by-case basis primarily in terms of their net contribution to enhanced deterrence and defense.

ACDA focuses on the arms control aspects of arms transfers and is required by law to be an active participant in the arms transfer decision-making process. It advises the Executive Branch on the extent to which proposed US arms transfers will contribute to an arms race, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements.

ACDA provides advice on the arms control implications of about 1,200 government-to-government requests for military equipment and commercial export license applications per year, many of which involve more than one weapon to more than one country. In addition, when requested, the Agency,in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense, prepares for the Congress, evaluations of the arms control implications of particular proposed sales. ACDA also

prepares statements of arms control considerations required by the Congress in conjunction with the annual Executive Branch authorization request for US security assistance to friendly or allied countries.

ACDA is an active participant in the implementation of controls on US exports of technology with both military and commercial applications (so-called "dual-use" technology) and is involved in both policy formulation and review of "East-West" and "North-South" technology transfers cases. The Agency is represented in the the Senior Interagency Group on the Transfer of Strategic Technology, chaired by the Department of State.

Particular attention is given to those cases involving the possible transfer of strategic technologies to the Soviet Union and its allies, and especially those with a potentially adverse impact on arms control verification, unauthorized transfers, or regional stability.

FY 1983 saw the Agency devoting increased attention to arms control issues associated with US civil and military space policies and activities, including peaceful cooperation and trade in space technology while limiting the proliferation of military strategic missile technology.

IV. DEFENSE PROGRAM IMPACTS

Analysis of defense policies, programs and technologies as they relate to arms control, including legislated arms control impact statements, are conducted by ACDA. Both active duty military and civilian staff members provide extensive capabilities in politico -military affairs to evaluate the national security implications of arms control proposals and their impact on military strategies and force postures.

ACDA's Defense Program and Analysis Division prepares Arms Control Impact Statements (ACIS) which analyze the possible implications of certain defense, technology, and nuclear programs. Each ACIS analyzes the possible implications of these programs for arms control policy and negotiations and represents a comprehensive arms control analysis. The FY 1983 ACIS submission included 10 arms control impact statements covering more than 85 programs of Defense and Energy Departments.

An annual study, World Military Expendures and Arms Transfers, also describes the size, trends and distribution of global military expenditures and arms trade. The thirteenth edition of the Agency's compendium on military expenditures and arms transfers was published in April 1982 and covers the decade from 1970 through 1979. The fourteenth edition will be published in March 1983.

In addition, the Agency also provides support for operational activities related to Antarctic inspections. ACDA's interest in this area stems from those provisions of the Antarctic Treaty which mandate that the Antarctic be used only for peaceful purposes, that Treaty-state observers have free access to any area, and that they may inspect all stations regardless of national jurisdiction. This establishes a precedent for other on-site inspections elsewhere.

The purpose of these inspections is to ensure that the Antarctic is being used exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that no military activities, weapons testing or nuclear waste disposals are taking place. When inspections are concluded on March 10,1983, US inspectors will have visited more than twice the number of stations inspected on any previous inspection. Some stations have never been visited befo-e and many other have not been visited since the 1960s.

V. ACDA FY 1984 and FY 1985 EXTERNAL RESEARCH

The ACDA FY 1984 and FY 1985 external research programs have been planned to support the activities of principal line bureaus within the limits set by the availability of financial resources. The emphasis will be in support of nuclear non-proliferation safeguards, and procedures, verification technologies, and the START and INF negotiations.

The following is a tabulation of the Agency's FY 1984 and FY 1985 external research for ongoing ACDA programs by bureau:

	FY-84	FY-85
Director's Reserve	$200,000	200,000
Multilateral Affairs	150,000	150,000
Strategic Programs	300,000	300,000
Nuclear and Weapons Control (including RERTR Program)	5,280,000	5,232,000
Verification/Intelligence	150,000	150,000
Total	$6,080,000	$6,032,000

The Director's reserve is used primarily for quick turn around analysis for priority projects that are difficult to predict in advance.

The external research programs of the Multilateral Affairs Bureau and the Strategic Programs Bureau are conducted to support the START, INF, SCC, MBFR, and other negotiations.

The Nuclear and Weapons Control Bureau uses its external research funds for studies and analyses in support of nonproliferation and safeguards responsibilities. Among these, the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactor program seeks to develop low enriched uranium fuels for use in research

reactors worldwide. Senior engineers and scientists of the Nuclear Weapons Control Bureau now direct the development of these vital fuels and are actively working to assure that low enriched uranium fuels are substituted for less desirable, weapons grade ones.

The mission of RERTR Program is to develop low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels at levels of 20 percent U-235 or less for use in research and test reactors. Most of the world's research and test reactors now operate on highly enriched uranium at levels of 90 percent U-235 or above. This fuel can readily be used to make nuclear weapons. It is very important, therefore, that use of these these highly enriched fuels be substantially reduced.

The RERTR Program began in 1978 at Argonne National Laboratory under the Department of Energy and is halfway towards achieving its technical objective of developing safe, economic LEU for research and test reactors.

In response to RERTR, a number of countries, including our closest European allies have established similar programs which involve direct collaboration with the US.

It is essential from a foreign policy and non-proliferation perspective that RERTR be continued and that it be funded at the level necessary to allow the work to continue at a good pace.

Competition within the Department of Energy, however, has challenged that Department's ability to provide RERTR program support. Consequently, the Office of Management and Budget has recommended that RERTR be transferred from the Department of Energy to ACDA in FY 1984 and thereafter.

Any deferred availability of designated funding can only result in comparable delay in the commercialization of LEU fuels and a further increase in the risk of nuclear proliferation. Therefore, it is important that ACDA be authorized to complete the RERTR program agenda.

Research conducted by the Bureau of Verification and Intelligence involves the organization, supervision, and review of studies and policy papers dealing with the verifiability of provisions of current and proposed arms control agreements. The Bureau's research efforts also involve assessments of US capabilities to verify arms control

agreements and treaties and the evaluation of new verification instruments, technologies and systems.

VI. CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Most day-to-day Agency relations with Congress are informally conducted between ACDA personnel, individual senators and congressmen, and their staff.

In addition, the Agency also provides expert witnesses for both House and Senate committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction within the arms control area. These include the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House and Senate Armed Services Committees, Appropriations Committees, and the Select Committees on Intelligence.

In 1982, the Agency supplied House and Senate Committees with briefings, testimony, and consultation in both open and closed sessions on arms control matters, chemical and toxin weapons control, intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe, strategic arms reductions, nuclear proliferation, and arms control in outer spacee. Agency officals appeared at over forty Congressional committee hearings and formal presentations.

ACDA supports the fullest possible exchange between the Congress and the Administration on START and other negotiations. ACDA views consultations with the cognizant Committees as the most effective method for keeping the Congress informed first hand of US arms control policies and efforts, and for getting, first hand, the views of Congress.

Effective implementation of US arms control policies involving nuclear and conventional weapons, nonproliferation, outer space, and compliance with and verification of international agreements have all been subjects of ACDA-Congressional dialogue.

The Public Affairs Unit of the Office of Congressional and Public Affairs carries out the Agency's legislative mandate for the dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control matters. It is responsible for all media contacts, press guidance on questions relating to Agency business, the planning and coordination of speaking engagements by ACDA officials, and the operation of the ACDA Library and Historical Unit.

In addition, the Office of Congressional and Public Affairs (CPA) also prepares publications for public distribution, such as Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, which contains the texts of major agreements in which the United States has participated since World War II and brief histories of their negotiation, and Documents on Disarmament, an annual compilation of official documents, of both US and foreign origin, including treaties, agreements, laws, proposals, resolutions, declarations, communiques, reports, speeches, and statements.

In its Annual Report, ACDA provides the Congress and the public with a comprehensive review of its goals, programs and activities. The 1982 Report, the twenty-second since the Agency's establishment, documents the program of arms control initiatives which the United States set into motion in 1982.

In responding to the Congressional mandate to disseminate and coordinate public information concerning arms control matters, Agency officials delivered many speeches on arms control policies to audiences in the United States. Numerous interviews with Agency officials by the print and electronic media supplemented their formal speeches and testimonies.

The Public Affairs Unit itself conducts a speakers' program to respond to the many public requests to hear presentations on the Administration's arms control policies. The Agency's speakers also assist the State Department's Office of Public Affairs in implementing its programs. Throughout 1982, ACDA speakers were travelling through the country speaking on arms control matters, or delivering such presentations at the Agency in response to numerous requests from academic and professional institutions in the Washington, D.C. area.

Since 1978, ACDA has awarded and administered the Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship in Arms Control Program. This national program encourages doctoral research in arms control subjects. A total of thirty-five fellowships have been awarded since the program's inception.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Do any of your colleagues have anything to say, or will they just respond to questions?

Dr. GEORGE. They will just respond to questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me start out with the meeting I had yesterday with supporters of a nuclear weapons freeze. I was delighted that my next appointment was with Ambassador Hartman, our Ambassador in Moscow, who needed to join me in this meeting of several hundred representatives from every corner of the State of Illinois.

We had to meet in the cafeteria. For the first time in 17 years I couldn't find a room large enough other than the cafeteria to meet with the outpouring of these hundreds of people. They gave me a report from virtually every one of the 24 congressional districts. They presented petitions, ranging up to 1,000 petitions, from each congressional district. This was one of the most imposing meetings I have had, and they were a cross-section of people, high on educational background, very high on motivation, and deeply concerned.

We had, I felt, a very constructive and helpful discussion. They are concerned about the risks we face in continuing the nuclear arms race, and we certainly are continuing it. It has gone on, and as they pointed out, what progress have we made since we have had a formal arms control program? We have continued ever since we have had this program to build more and more arms.

I pointed out we did stop the ABM and we had a few other agreements, but still, over all, proliferating remains a major threat. Now, some 18 countries are either working toward having nuclear weaponry or actually have them now, and we are increasing our arsenals on both sides, the Soviets and our own.

What answer do we give, do you give? I wish I had had all of you there. It is your responsibility. You have the charter. Do you think, for instance, that we are going to conclude an INF agreement within the first term of the Reagan administration? Will we have anything comparable to, say, the SALT II, faulty as it might have been, it was a treaty. In your judgment, will we reach the goal of having a treaty for START and INF?

Dr. GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, let me first of all say the administration is also concerned about this, which is why we have the two delegations in Geneva. Without getting into a debate, I would point out that we did stop, essentially stop, building nuclear weapon delivery systems.

We haven't really built new ICBM's for 10 or 15 years for example. But that is neither here nor there at this point.

The administration is concerned about arms control. We have two delegations in Geneva and they are extremely experienced. We couldn't get better people than Ambassador Nitze or Ambassador Rowny. They are very serious about the arms control talks, and I think there is a very good chance that, yes, we will have some type of agreement in the first term of the Reagan administration.

Mr. GRAHAM. If I could just add to what Dr. George has said, in the INF negotiations which have been going on since November 1981, there has been a lot of progress made on peripheral issues. A lot of the underbrush has been cleared away. The central issues have not been

resolved, that is true, but if they can be, and we all hope they can be in the near future, we could quickly proceed to an agreement.

The START negotiations are a little behind, since they started 6 or 7 months later, but there have been some significant exchanges and progress on peripheral issues there as well. Once again we are still separated on the central issues, but these things do take time.

The CHAIRMAN. The position—and I think there was a total consensus of the hundreds there—articulated by one spokesman is that what we have been doing so far has been a failure and we must have something new, some breakthrough. Possibly that is the way that President Sadat sized it up when he decided to go to Jerusalem. I know because I had talked to him about it. Our policy of finding peace in the Middle East was a failure. We had to have something new, and he decided to do some dramatic things to emphasize that. He went to Jerusalem. He addressed the Knesset. He said: I will seek peace with Israel. He brought it out and made Camp David possible.

I am saying to this administration, we have to have some breakthroughs on the economy and do some dramatic things. We are trying to move in that direction. We have done dramatic things already and the results are beginning to show. We have to have a breakthrough in the Middle East and we have to have some thing comparable. I think the President's speech was a breakthrough, and I hope we can take it off of the back burner and put it onto the front burner if we can work out this troop withdrawal in Lebanon that is holding it up and impeding progress in the Middle East.

We must also have a breakthrough in arms control, and you have the primary responsibility in the Government for this. Now, as their solution yesterday they proposed a freeze. The resolution was put in and sponsored by many of our colleagues and authored essentially by Senators Hatfield and Kennedy. The resolution expressing the sense of the Congress without requiring the President to take specific action, but it does call upon the United States and the Soviet Union to pursue a complete halt to the nuclear arms race, decide when and how to achieve a mutual, verifiable freeze on testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems, and incorporate negotiations on intermediate range nuclear missiles into the strategic arms talks, working toward reductions, big reductions they are calling for in arms.

Now, how do you answer them and say that that is an illogical approach. The President had some unflattering things to say about it yesterday in Florida before a religious conference.

How do you answer, as experts in arms control? What is wrong with their philosophy? What is wrong with the philosophy of many of our colleagues who have signed on to the freeze resolution, including, I believe, Senator Pell?

[Senator Pell nods affirmatively.]

Dr. GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make two or three points. First of all, concerning your breakthrough point, I would argue that our zero-zero proposal and our one-third reduction in START are breakthroughs. Now, these are continuing negotiations and while there will probably be some changes, these already constitute major breakthroughs.

A lot of people have said the Soviets wouldn't sit down with us, but they have. So I think we are off to a good start.

On the nuclear freeze issue, quite frankly I think if you have a nuclear freeze, there would be a good chance the Soviets might stop talking to us in Geneva. What incentive would they have to talk to us if there was a freeze? The freeze would give them superiority in heavy missiles. It would give them superiority in INF systems.

So I think it would probably cause a delay. At least there would have to be some sort of reassessment. I think what the administration wants is to go beyond the freeze. We don't want the freeze in Europe; we want zero-zero which is better than a freeze, in our estimation. We don't want 7,500 nuclear warheads or the exact number; we want 5,000. That is better than a freeze, in my estimation.

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, just to add to that, the freeze resolution language refers to a mutual and verifiable freeze. Well, if it is going to be mutual, that means the Soviet Union has to agree to it. If it is going to be verifiable, that means we must, to the extent it is possible, verify various aspects of the freeze.

That means we will have to negotiate verification provisions, and we are going to have to negotiate what is covered by the freeze and what is not. All of that will take years to do. If we are going to spend years negotiating, why not attempt, as the President has proposed, to negotiate reductions, to negotiate equality at lower levels?

Why negotiate just to ratify the current very high levels that exist? The U.S. INF proposal is to eliminate a whole class of nuclear weapon systems. Why negotiate for years only to come out where we are now?

The CHAIRMAN. That is why I first started out with the question: do you think you are going to get results?

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, we hope so.

The CHAIRMAN. Because what we are doing is continuing to build, build, build, and they are continuing to build, build, build, and we have been doing that for years, ever since the first atomic bomb was developed. Their question is: Is the procedure paying off? Are we just taking one step forward with this treaty and that treaty and then giant steps backward as the world continues to add to its nuclear arsenal and we add to the danger of possible miscalculations?

Mr. Turrentine, as Acting Assistant Director of the Bureau of Nuclear and Weapons Control, would you care to comment on this, and what kind of answers would you provide to them when they say verifiable? They had experts with them that were extremely well-versed on the problems in these issues. They made it eminently clear to me they are not for unilateral disarmament. They are opposed to it. That is why they emphasize that it must be mutual.

Why don't we make a daring proposal to the Soviets, see whether they will put up or shut up on this issue? They have said they are for it, but do you think in your judgment, knowing the Soviets as you do, do you think that if we put the challenge to them, they would accept it? Or would we have in a sense called their bluff?

That is why the group was saying yesterday, why don't you at least take this position? They are saying that they are for reductions. They are just saying stop the expansion now; don't we both have a sufficiency, relative parity overall, and can't we move toward a reduction?

Now, how do you answer that?

Senator PELL. Before replying, I would like to address the chairman briefly.

The CHAIRMAN. We will defer a reply to my question, keep it in the record, in continuity. Senator Pell has a time problem I didn't know he had, and I would be happy to yield to him to finish up his questions so he can go back to his other hearing.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. George, we have seen a lot of cuts in the Agency's permanent personnel in the past 4 years. Last year in our committee report on the authorization bill, we advised against any further cuts. Yet, since then, I believe 11 positions have been eliminated.

What could be done to avoid this gradual diminution in your manpower, and was any consideration given to the committee's request when you reduced?

Dr. GEORGE. Senator Pell, first let me say that most agencies took cuts in the last 2 years. Second, we haven't found any diminution in our ability to do our negotiations. We are still progressing. If we need more people, we have the ability to hire 10 people. We don't feel we need the extra people.

Senator PELL. In other words, there is no reduction in negotiating ability?

Dr. GEORGE. No, sir. The negotiating staff is approximately the same. My institutional memory is a bit weak on this, but I understand from a number of people that it is about the same.

Senator PELL. Would you provide for the record a breakdown of the personnel associated with each of the Agency's bureaus?

Dr. GEORGE. Yes, sir.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

Last year Senator Pressler amended the ADCA organization to direct you to intensify your research and development effort in the area of space-related arms control. What has been the effect of this amendment on your activities? Has there been any increase outside of contracting in this regard?

Dr. GEORGE. Yes, sir, there has been. We have because of the amendment started some studies. We have five studies underway. They are of a classified nature, and we have advised Senator Pressler in a letter to that effect. But yes.

Senator PELL. I would like to enter into the record at this point a letter adopted by the North American Assembly urging governments to press for negotiations leading to agreements aimed at the limitation of development of weapons in space, and I would ask if you have seen any increase in activity with regard to arms control efforts in space.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be incorporated into the record.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

[The material referred to follows:]

RESOLUTION 132 ON ARMS CONTROL IN OUTER SPACE[1]

The Assembly,

Noting that on 24 May 1982, the US-Soviet agreement on cooperation in space expired and that discussion of future co-operative projects has been suspended;

Concerned that inadequate progress has been made in seeking arms limitation in outer space;

[1] Presented by the Scientific and Technical Committee. Text adopted.

Regretting that the United States and the USSR are actively developing anti-satellite weapons and are already testing aerial detection and attack systems (ASAT);

Recalling that a major superpower armament competition was avoided by the SALT I limitation on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) development and that the simultaneous failure to limit multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) deployment has destablished the strategic nuclear balance, which in turn has created pressure to abrogate the ABM treaty;

Concerned that the failure to limit deployment of outer space weapons could have more profound effects on arms control and international security and that inadequate consideration has been given to the potentially negative impact of new Soviet systems on Alliance security;

Urges member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

1. to conduct co-operation with the United States a comprehensive analysis of the ways in which verifiable agreements governing weapons in space, anti-satellite programs, and peacefull co-operation in space would enhance the security of the Alliance; and

2. to press for negotiations leading to agreements aimed principally at limitation of the deployment of offensive weapons in space.

Dr. GEORGE. Yes, sir, there has been an increase in activity. Last year we did not pursue it, but this year we intend to pursue the subject of outer space arms control in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva which started last month.

Senator PELL. Would you concur with my fear that we have already started to see the beginnings of an arms race in space today?

Dr. GEORGE. To the best of my knowledge, the Soviets have tested an ASAT weapon for 10 or 15 years, and we have one due to come on ourselves next year, but I know of no real race going on in outer space. There is a lot of talk about it, a lot of studies, but I don't think there is an outer space arms race at present.

Of course, there are a series of treaties, including a test ban treaty, that would prohibit some of this.

Senator PELL. On another subject, how many times has the General Advisory Committee [GAC] met in the last year or two?

Dr. GEORGE. Twice a year.

Senator PELL. Twice a year?

Dr. GEORGE. Yes. They are leaving this weekend to start this session.

Senator PELL. Has it played a significant role in the formulation of our arms control proposal?

Dr. GEORGE. I am sorry? Did you say the GAC?

Senator PELL. Yes.

Dr. GEORGE. I am sorry. I thought you meant SCC.

Senator PELL. No; the General Advisory Committee.

Dr. GEORGE. They have met five times this year, and they are meeting again tomorrow. They meet about once every 2 months.

Senator PELL. Do its recommendations play any role in the formulation of your policy?

Dr. GEORGE. Yes; they do. They usually give the Director some advice on what to do.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Before you leave, I think we share a concern that there may be indecision in ACDA without a permanent director in place. I would like to see the process speeded up as much as possible so that we can resolve the uncertainty and get it behind us.

The minority has completed their views on Ambassador Adelman. Would it be possible for the majority views to be available at the

earliest possible time, if they would be finished up today, for instance, so that we could get that report over to the Senate. Possibly, if there appears to be a break in the schedule, then get it started on the Senate floor before the recess?

Senator PELL. My understanding was it would not be taken up until after the recess.

The CHAIRMAN. My understanding is there is a possibility the majority leader would want to take it up before then if he finds that we have time, and I think it would be in the interest of everyone to see that this situation is resolved at the earliest possible time. I would hope we could take it up Monday.

Senator PELL. We will do our best in that regard. It has not yet been approved by all of the members involved.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be the best estimate of when you might be able to get it done? As I say, the minority views are completed.

Senator PELL. I would think we should be able to finish it up this week.

The CHAIRMAN. Today is Wednesday. Would it be possible, do I understand you could comfortably get it by tomorrow night?

Senator PELL. No; I think I would want leeway until Monday, through the week.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it would be filed this week, then.

Senator PELL. We will do our best.

The CHAIRMAN. I would hope so because we really would then be delaying the work of the Senate if we couldn't have it, and I think we ought to have that report.

Senator PELL. We will do our best.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much.

I have a few additional questions, but first I would like to go back, and I would ask without objection that the continuity of my question would be continued following Senator Pell's questions.

If we could have your comments on the question I left hanging.

Mr. TURRENTINE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would like to say that I have spoken in public on occasion on nuclear nonproliferation issues and also on arms transfers issues. These are issues for which I have a responsibility. Inevitably when I have done this I have been asked questions about the freeze, and I can certainly share with you how I have responded to these questions.

First of all, I think that it is quite clear that those who are genuinely interested in a freeze or in bringing nuclear arms under control share a common objective, and I think the administration shares that objective.

I honestly believe the approach we are taking at this time—that is, to seek negotiations on the intermediate nuclear forces—as a first step, and closely in tandem with that, to work on the strategic arms reductions—provides the best opportunity for a more stable and beneficial agreement at an earlier date than the freeze approach.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you advise the committee of the reaction of our allies in Europe, for instance, as to what their judgment would be as to the effect of a freeze. How would they react to the Congress calling for a verifiable freeze and working toward reductions in weaponry?

I think it is desirable to work wherever we can with our allies, although obviously we are keeping them up to date on START, which is a bilateral negotiation. We are keeping them well up to date with what we are doing, but INF deeply involves them.

What is their attitude?

Dr. GEORGE. On that I would point out that all of our NATO allies have stuck with us closely, and know that the SS–20's are pointed at them, and I think they would like to see the zero option. And a freeze would mean that those SS–20's and the old SS–4's and SS–5's will still be there. A freeze would also mean that the Soviets would have a numerical superiority. So I do not think they would like to see a freeze at all.

Mr. GRAHAM. I would like to say that I believe the allies would not be happy with the United States adopting the proposed freeze approach. If memory serves me correctly, there have been arguments against the freeze concept in the German Parliament.

In any case, as Dr. George has just said, a freeze would legislate a vast Soviet preponderance in theater forces. The first proposal the Soviets made in the INF negotiations was a moratorium or, in effect, a freeze leaving them with this great preponderance, and the allies were definitely not in favor of that. So I think it is safe to assume it would not be regarded favorably by our European allies.

Dr. GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, if I might also add, we have another ally on the west coast. The Japanese also do not want those SS–20's pointing at them.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe this is one reason why people have said war is too important for it to be left to the generals. We have had civilian control in Government. That may be why people are saying today nuclear war is so horrible and so possible now that we should not leave it to governments. The people want something to say about it. As John F. Kennedy in his famous inaugural address in 1960 said: "For man holds in his moral hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life." That could be extended to all living things, and this is why I think there is such a strong growing movement.

And I see, if my own State is any indication, a very strong movement in this regard. They just want more action than we have been able to take.

Now, there were questions raised in my meeting with the Illinois group that came here. They all came at their own expense. There was no organization funding them. They came because they were concerned enough, they wanted to sit down and talk with their representatives. They indicated that they recognized the value of verification. One of them indicated that onsite verification was provided in one of these treaties that had been signed years ago by both the Soviet Union and the United States by the President. Yet, neither the Threshold Test Ban [TTB] Treaty nor the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion [PNE] Treaty has been ratified by the Senate.

As you noticed, I have a 2-year running battle to get that moved forward to establish the principle of verification through onsite inspection, which for the first time is provided in a treaty. What is your own judgment as to how far along we are now? I am pleased to report we have taken a positive attitude on the President's level. He per-

sonally made a decision to move ahead, and now would you explain what we are trying to accomplish with the Soviets on verification, how lengthy a negotiation do you think that will be?

Do you think they will accept a protocol modifying these accords? And, at what point do you think the Senate can receive that proposal and a firm recommendation from the administration that we move ahead and ratify those treaties and advise and consent on them so they can be ratified?

Dr. GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, as you know, the President did make that decision, and we have notified the Soviet Union's representative. They have not gotten back to us yet. We anticipate they will very shortly, and we also anticipate within a month or so—please do not pin me down with the dates—we will sit down and exchange views with them. I hope it is in April, May at the latest.

As for the outcome, we are optimistic. We think our changes would clarify it. As you know, we have had questions on their tests; they have had questions on ours. So we hope they will also come to us and clear up these ambiguities.

I would like to make one point, Mr. Chairman, on this inspection provision on which you commented. It provides a very narrow, specific onsite inspection procedure. It is not a blanket onsite inspection procedure. It is only if they test peaceful nuclear explosions, a series of tests aggregating above 150 kilotons. So it is very narrow. It does not provide blanket onsite inspection.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone care to make any amplification on those comments?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. One frustration that obviously is harder for a totalitarian government to understand is that we do change administrations. Although we have a continuity of government, there is a new team in place from time to time. This frustration was evidenced in very strong terms to me in November 1980 in the Kremlin. I assured them that President-elect Reagan was devoted to arms control, would move with dispatch, and that he would seriously want to move into arms control that called for deep reductions in our existing stocks and the rest of the arms race. and this was encouraging.

But the administration has taken 10 months to develop its INF proposal, 17 months to begin START, and it has taken 2 years to review the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties.

Do you believe this can in part be blamed on insufficient manpower and a small research budget in ACDA?

Dr. GEORGE. No, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. In your view how much money should be available for external research on arms control, and does this budget have an adequate amount in it?

Dr. GEORGE. Our budget is $1.1 million and that is, we think, adequate. We think that is sufficient to do the studies.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe the arms control impact statements have worked as intended to give ACDA an influential role in the weapons acquisition process?

Dr. GEORGE. Yes, sir; very much so. We have a lot of contact with the Department of Defense, and they do pay attention to our reports.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you give examples of instances where this has occurred?

Dr. GEORGE. Let me refer that to the Acting Assistant Director in charge, Arch Turrentine. These are prepared in Mr. Turrentine's bureau.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turrentine.

Mr. TURRENTINE. Mr. Chairman, we are involved very early in the budget cycle with the Department of Defense in looking at the systems and selecting those that meet the statutory requirement for treatment in arms control impact statements [ACIS].

We find we work very closely with the Department of Defense itself and the uniformed services and with DDR&E. There is an open flow of information and a cooperative effort in which we take the lead.

As you know, we have attempted in the last several years to streamline the process to make it as efficient as possible and reduce the burden on the participating agencies. And I think we have done rather well in achieving these objectives.

The CHAIRMAN. What proportion of ACDA's manpower is devoted to preparing arms control impact statements each year?

Mr. TURRENTINE. Mr. Chairman, I could provide you with the actual man-hours expended. It is rather difficult to determine because the entire agency is involved. We have one division that is exclusively devoted to this activity during the process, but the entire Agency reviews the drafts and participates in the process. However, I can provide you for the record the man-hours expended on this.

The CHAIRMAN. Approximately how much does DOD spend on external research on arms control and arms control-related topics in comparison to ACDA?

Mr. TURRENTINE. Mr. Chairman, I do not have that information, but I will attempt to obtain it and provide it for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. If we could just get that on an estimated basis or a rough-ratio basis, I would appreciate it.

Would your proposed budget be sufficient if new arms control talks were to begin or if ongoing negotiations were to be intensified?

Dr. GEORGE. If we initiate more major negotiations, we might have to come back for a supplemental, Mr. Chairman; but we think it is adequate for everything that we see in the foreseeable future.

The CHAIRMAN. I would wonder how long you might need in the event you want to supplement your comments for any of the questions that have been put to you, how long would you want the record left open? Would it be satisfactory to have the record left open until say 9 tomorrow morning to supplement any questions that have been put to you?

Dr. GEORGE. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be fine. Without objection, I will ask that a print be made of this particular session so that if it is requested on the floor during the debate on the nomination of Ambassador Adelman that it will be available to the Senators.

I thank you very much indeed for your appearance this morning.

Dr. GEORGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Additional questions and answers follow:]

ACDA's Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record

Question 1. Last year, the appropriations committees rejected the transfer of the RERTR program, from the Department of Energy to the Agency. Can you explain why the Administration has ignored the views of Congress on this issue?

Answer. The Administration has included the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program in the ACDA budget request for FY 1984 in order to emphasize the importance attached to this program in terms of supporting our nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The program's objective of promoting non-proliferation is clearly within ACDA's statutory mandate. From the start of the program in 1978 ACDA has contributed substantially to efforts aimed at converting as many research reactors as possible from high-enriched, weapons-grade fuel to low-enriched fuel that reduces the risk of proliferation. ACDA has the necessary legal authority and technical capability to continue implementation of this program. ACDA intends to continue working closely with the Department of Energy and other interested agencies to ensure that this program is completed in as efficient and effective manner as possible. ACDA stands ready to consult with the Congress regarding the authorization and appropriation for this program, and is prepared to continue its strong support for the program regardless of where it resides.

Question 2. Exclusive of the RERTR program for low enrichment fuels, the ACDA budget represents a cut of nearly $3.5 million from last year's authorization level. Given the intense demands of negotiations on the Agency and the likelihood that new negotiations, such as talks on Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaty verification issues, will increase ACDA's work load, how do you justify the meager ACDA budget?

Answer. ACDA's FY 1984 budget request for continuing programs, exclusive of that for the RERTR program, is $16,405,000. This is an increase of $1,263,000 from the FY 1983 appropriation level of $15,142,000. Provision has been made in this request for a modest increase in the rate of negotiations which the Agency supports. As the Agency has previously testified, the FY 1984 budget request for continuing ACDA programs is lean and without padding. If we experience a significant increase in the activity of ACDA's work, a supplemental budget request will be necessary.

Question 3. We have seen repeated cuts in the Agency's permanent personnel strength during the past few years. Last year, in the Committee's report on the ACDA authorization bill, the Committee advised against further cuts. Since then, eleven permanent positions have been eliminated.

(a) Was any consideration given to the Committee's recommendation?

(b) Can the Agency be an effective force in policymaking and negotiations at this time, given its reduced manpower?

(c) Should negotiations requirements dictate increasingly ACDA's personnel levels, can such increase be funded within the proposed Agency budget?

Answer. (a) ACDA is carefully watching the Agency's expenditures of funds. At the present time, we believe that we are satisfying all of the support requirements for our delegations. At this point in FY 1983, the Agency is on budget assuming a full-staff level and the availability of $301,000 included in our pay raise supplemental request. This does, however, indicate that at the current funding level the Agency's financial resources are fully committed and that additional funding will be required if we take on additional responsibilities. The reduced 11 positions referred to occurred between FY 1982 and FY 1983. ACDA has taken into consideration the Committee's recommendation concerning the personnel complement. The staffing level for FY 1984 including full-time permanent, other and detailee positions is the same as the previous year and is indicative of ACDA's success in convincing OMB that further reductions in our personnel resources was not warranted.

(b) The Agency believes that it is an effective force in policy-making and negotiations related to arms control issues and that our present personnel ceilings will permit us to carry out our mission on the negotiating schedule as we now know it. If the pace of these activities increases significantly, the Agency will require additional personnel in an amount that will be governed by the amount and type of increase.

(c) If our negotiating activities require an increase in personnel levels in any significant amount, the Agency will require additional funding. Even for a modest increase in qualified personnel, funds would not be available for added salary expenses unless the Agency further reduced its external research commit-

ment. We do not believe that such a reduction would be prudent and therefore a supplemental budget request would be necessary.

Question 4. Given the central role of negotiations in the Agency's activities, why does the negotiating branch have such a small proportion of the Agency's personnel relative to other bureaus, particularly the Nuclear Weapons and Control Bureau?

Answer. ACDA devotes a significant amount of its resources to the support of our delegations. Assistance to them is provided primarily by the SP and MA bureaus. The total staff of these two bureaus is 53 full-time permanent, other, and detailee positions. This compares to the total personnel complement of the Nuclear Weapons and Control Bureau of 48 positions.

It is important to note that the NWC Bureau was formed by combining two prior bureaus, and that NWC is, therefore, actually carrying out the work of two previously separate units. Moreover, a large proportion of the work of the Nuclear and Weapons Control Bureau is to fulfill statutory requirements relating to our non-proliferation, arms transfer and ACIS responsibilities.

Question 5. The Scowcroft Commission that is examining U.S. strategic programs reportedly has begun to assess U.S. arms control policy as well.

(a) Do you know whether the Departments of State and Defense have provided their views to the Commission?

(b) Has ACDA been asked to testify to the Commission?

(c) If yes, what was the Agency's response?

Answer. Department of State, Department of Defense and ACDA representatives met with the Commission on January 31. ACDA gave its views on the relationship of the Commission's work to our arms control negotiating efforts in Geneva and the arms control implications of various ICBM basing concepts being considered with regard to existing U.S. treaties and agreements.

Question 6. How many of the arms control-related inter-agency groups does ACDA chair? Why does not ACDA have a larger leadership role?

Answer. ACDA chairs the Backstopping Committees for the negotiations on START, INF, Threshold Test Ban, Standing Consultative Commission, and the Committee on Disarmament. ACDA also chairs the Standing Consultative Commission Working Group.

ACDA also plays a major role in other inter-agency groups dealing with arms control issues that it does not chair.

Question 7. To what extent, if any, is ACDA involved in the weapons procurement process today?

Answer. ACDA takes the lead in drafting and coordinating the Arms Control Impact Statements (ACIS) which assess the arms control impact of major weapons systems and related programs in each budget cycle. The ACIS process involves ACDA in the assessment of significant new weapon systems and serves to heighten the awareness of the interagency national security community with respect to arms control considerations.

Question 8. Give a breakdown of personnel by bureau.

Answer. Following is a breakdown of ACDA's personnel by bureau and office:

Bureau/office	FTP	FTE	Reimbursement	Total
Office of the Director	18	6	7	31
Strategic Programs	19	3	4	26
Strategic Assessments	3	.....	3	3
Multilateral Affairs	19	1	7	27
Nuclear and Weapons Control	33	7	8	48
Administration	23	6	4	33
General Counsel	8	.....	.....	8
Congressional and Public Affairs	18	1	.....	19
Verification and Intelligence	13	.....	2	15
Total	154	24	32	210

Question 9. How much effort is expended in developing ACIS?

Answer. The man-hours expended on ACIS have declined considerably over the past 6 years as the ACDA staff has gained experience in the process and more efficient procedures have been developed. In the FY 1979 ACIS cycle, over 48,000 man hours were expended, while the FY 1982 cycle (the last one for which specific times were kept) required less than 17,000 man hours—a reduction of nearly 65 percent and a 22 percent decrease from FY 1982. We estimate that the expenditures of resources in the FY 1984 cycle was similar to FY 1983. ACDA's share is roughly 50 percent of the total or about 8500 man hours.

Question 10. How much does DOD spend on arms control research compared with the ACDA external research budget?

Answer. The ACDA external research budget for FY 1984 is $6.080 million, out of which $4.980 million has been requested for the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program. The FY 1983 external research budget for continuing ACDA programs is $1,152,000. It is essentially the same for FY 1984. Our FY 1984 appropriations request includes $1.1 million for research related to on-going ACDA programs.

All ACDA external research is directly related to arms control. We do not have any information on what DOD spends on arms control research. However, we are requesting that DOD provide this information directly to the Committee as soon as it is available.

[Whereupon, the committee took up other business.]

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[Whereupon, the 12:35 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

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